allowance recipient spells varies with the financial incentives of welfare benefits. This issue is of policy importance since the funding of housing allowances is by nature open-ended and driven by demand. Thus knowledge of how the recipient duration varies with benefi t levels is very helpful for governments to gauge the expenditure budget on housing allowances. The recipient's sensitivity to benefi t generosity is also a crucial 
Introduction
In a good number of developed countries, the housing allowance has been developed as the primary housing-related public assistance measure and, at times, the largest in-kind transfer (Åren, 2004; Stephen, 2005) .
1 Given its growing prominence in the welfare budget of many countries, increasing attention is given to how the duration of the housing factor in the optimal design of a housing allowance system (Fallis, 1990) . In addition, this issue is essential to our understanding of welfare dependence on housing allowances (Chen, 2006) . However, to the author's best knowledge, earlier studies of this topic are mainly theoretical and no previous study has empirically examined it. This paper is an attempt to bridge this gap.
In 1997, the Swedish housing allowance system implemented a dramatic reform on the income-testing regulation for claimants who were couples with children. This reform considerably affected all couple-with-children households' fi nancial incentives to apply for housing allowance benefi ts, although some were affected directly and some indirectly. It thus provided exogenous variability in the benefi t level. However, what made the 1997 reform particularly interesting for the topic explored in this paper is that this reform only affected couple-with-children recipients but left single-parent recipients virtually unaffected. Hence, the reform schedule offered a unique opportunity to analyse the impacts of benefi t generosity on recipient duration in a quasi-experimental setting. Very few reforms have left such a clear-cut distinction between control and treatment groups. As is easy to see, in this quasi-experiment, the-couple-with children recipients are the 'treatment group' and the single-parent recipients constitute the 'control group' .
Exploiting the quasi-experiment dimension of the 1997 reform, this paper applies the difference-in-difference (DD) estimation strategy. The DD estimator is credibly much more robust than the more commonly used before-and-after (BA) estimator in that the DD estimator provides the potential to remove the common-trend bias that plagues the BA estimator results. Despite the fact that DD estimators have been employed frequently in other fi elds of economic research (see for example, Carling et al. 2001) , they are still quite rare in the fi eld of urban policy evaluation studies.
This paper is also special in its careful attention to treating the interaction effects in non-linear models. As Ai and Norton (2003) have shown, in non-linear models, the sign and signifi cance of coeffi cient estimates of interaction terms are invalid for indicating the true sign and signifi cance of interaction effects-a point largely neglected by most previous social researchers. This paper follows Ai and Norton's way of measuring and interpreting interaction effects in logit discretetime hazard models.
Another advantage of this paper is the high-quality data it uses. We extracted sample recipient observations from the Swedish micro longitudinal database LINDA, which contains very rich individual household characteristics. As this is a taxpayer registration databank, the reliability is exceptionally good. The period we examine is from 1991 to 2002, which provides a suffi ciently long time-frame in which to assess the impacts of the 1997 reform.
The remaining part of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional background of the Swedish housing allowance system as well as the contents and implications of the 1997 reform; section 3 explains the empirical methodology used in this paper; section 4 gives the data description; section 5 presents the empirical fi ndings and discussions; fi nally, section 6 provides the concluding remarks.
Institutional Background and the 1997 Reform
The housing allowance has been a component in Swedish housing policy since the 1970s. However, it was only after the early 1990s that it began to gain signifi cant prominence. In 2002, about 60 per cent of single parents and 15.3 per cent of all Swedish households were assisted with a housing allowance (SCB, 2004) .
The Swedish Housing Allowance System
The Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket) emphasises that the housing allowance is to 'support households during economically difficult periods' (Boverket, 1999 
where, HA p is applicable housing allowances; Y is the assessed income; and Q the income threshold. The applicable housing allowance consists of two components: one comprises segmented fractions of coverable housing expenses; another is a lump-sum payment that varies across households with different numbers of children (see Table 1 ).
The formula suggests that the housing allowance in Sweden is means-tested and that its form is a hybrid of the percentage-of-rent and the gap types (Fallis, 1990) . It is a gap type in the sense that, if an applicant's assessed income exceeds a prescribed level of income threshold, the receivable housing allowances have to be deducted from the applicable housing allowance at a tax-back rate of 20 per cent 3 000 3 000-5 300  117 000  2 500  267 000  2  900  2 000-3 300 3 300-5 900  117 000  3 175  307 500  3+  1 200  2 000-3 600 3 600-6 600  117 000  3 900  351 000 Notes: mt = month; yr = year. Figures in column 3 state that: if an applicant's monthly housing expenses exceeded the associated lower bound but were less than the associated higher bound, 75 per cent of his or her housing expenses would be covered by housing allowances. In column 4, the coverage of housing expenses within the two bounds by housing allowances is 50 per cent. Housing expenses beyond the associated higher bound in column 4 would not be covered by housing allowances.
Source: Columns 1-4 are from Boverket (1999, Appendix, of the portion of his or her income surpassing the income threshold. Columns 1-5 in Table 1 explain the specifi cation rules of the child grant, coverable housing expenses and income thresholds in 1996. Before 1996, there were minor differences in these rules. The 1997 reform reformulated the income threshold to 58 500 SEK/year per adult applicant in the applicant household if the adult applicant is married and kept it at 117 000 SEK/year if the adult applicant is single.
3 SInce 1997, changes to the regulation rules have also been small. More information on Swedish housing allowance schedules can be found in Boverket (1999, Appendix 4) .
Using columns 1-4 in Table 1 , it is easy to infer the maximum monthly housing allowances that each type of household could apply for in 1996. Inserting this number into the income-testing schedule and using the income threshold level associated, we can determine Y*, the income ceiling above which a household automatically lost the qualifi cation for housing allowances. These two fi gures are reported in columns 6-7 of Table 1 . According to the administrative data, the highest annual household income among housing allowance recipients in 1996 was 345 000 SEK (Boverket, 1999, Appendix 4) .
Implications of the 1997 Reform
Prior to the 1997 reform, the income threshold for couple-with-children households was 117 000 SEK/year per household. However, after the reform, this threshold was cut to 58 500 SEK/year per adult applicant in the applicant household.
To help readers intuitively understand how this policy change affected couple-withchildren recipients, we provide a simple numerical example. Consider a couple-withchildren household with the same amount of applicable housing allowances in 1996 and 1997-for example, a maximum of 38 100 SEK/year if the couple had two dependent children (see Table 1 , multiplying the cells in the 6th column by 12). Assume further that in both years there was only one wage-earner in this household and that the wage-earner's income exceeded 117 500 SEK/year but was below 249 000 SEK/year, 4 a typical salary for a full-time worker in Sweden.
5 If this household applied for housing allowances in both years, they would fi nd that the housing allowance they received in 1997 was 11 700 SEK/year less than what they received in 1996. Note that the average housing rent paid by a Swedish tenant family in 1997 was 45 500 SEK/year (SCB, 2004) ; hence, a loss of 11 700 SEK/year is economically signifi cant even for a middleincome family. This example applies only to a typical single-wage-earner couple. We now extend to the more general cases, especially those involving two-wage-earner couples.
We consider three possible scenarios one by one. First, if both parties consistently earned more than 58 500 SEK/year before and after the reform, they would not experience direct losses. Secondly, if both parties consistently earned less than 58 500 SEK/year before and after the reform, they would again not experience direct losses. The third scenario involves one party consistently earning less than 58 500 SEK/year and the other consistently earning more than that amount. This scenario includes the single-wage-earner couple as a special case and is the only situation in which the 1997 reform had a direct impact. 
It is interesting to fi nd that the closer Y s is to 58 500, the less this couple would suffer direct losses due to the reform. Put another way, the more uneven the income distribution between the two parties, the larger would be the direct losses; the more equal between them, the smaller would be the direct losses. When Y s equals 0, we return to the singlewage-earner couple case and fi nd that they encounter the maximum direct losses due to the reform at 11 700 SEK/year.
To understand why this reform has had such implications, we must fi rst briefl y discuss its motivations. Acknowledged in offi cial statements, the primary aim of the 1997 reform was to reduce public budget expenditure on housing subsidies. It was alleged that the escalating costs of housing allowance expenditure in the early 1990s imposed great pressure on the Swedish central government's budget balance (Boverket, 1999) . Meanwhile, the 1997 reform also refl ected that the Swedish housing allowance system had begun to focus on a target population of mainly single-parent households (RFV, 2003) . Further, another key aim of this reform, as identifi ed by the government, was to stimulate work incentives and reduce the chances of married/cohabiting couples letting one party "stay at home with a state subsidy" (RFV, 2003, p. 42) . Correspondingly, the reform also sought to promote gender equality and the equal distribution of income within couples (Boverket, 1999) . As the earlier analysis reveals, single-wage-earner couples were the most severely affected by the reform while, for two-wage-earner couples, the more even the distribution of incomes within couples, the smaller were the direct losses due to the reform.
Taking the discussions of reform impacts at face value, one may be tempted to believe that only some couples were affected by the reform-i.e. those with one party earning more than 58 500 SEK/year and one party earning less. It appears that the 1997 reform had no direct impact on couples in which both parties consistently earned less than 58 500 SEK/year or both parties consistently earned more than that. However, we argue differently. First, the data suggest that the seemingly unaffected households accounted for only a small proportion (typically less than 30 per cent for most years) of all couple-withchildren recipients (Boverket, 1999; RFV, 2003) ; Secondly, and more crucially, when this new regulation was established and enacted, it was equivalent to imposing a new constraint on all couple-with-children households' utility-maximising programming. For example, a two-wage-earner couple-withchildren household in which both parities earned good incomes might have once considered letting one party stay home to spend more time taking care of their children. However, with the reform, this probability was reduced since for these households the opportunity costs of switching from twowage-earner labour supply to single-wageearner labour supply were increased. Consequently, the fi nancial incentive to remain on housing allowances was reduced for these couples after the reform. More discussion on labour supply responses to housing allowances can be found in Fallis (1990) and Nordvik and Åren (2005) .
On the other hand, since 1997, the Swedish housing allowance system has been operated in a way that it is preliminarily granted to the applicants with testing based on their own anticipation of the following year's incomes and will be checked when they submit their tax return. If the benefi ts received exceed what the applicants should be granted according to their actual incomes, the excess must be paid with a fi ne. Thus, when the incometesting threshold was set much lower than it had been, implying that even a low-income couple-with-children recipient found it too easy to exceed the income-testing threshold, many couple-with-children households were discouraged from entering or remaining in the housing allowance system. In summary, our standpoint is that all couple-with-children recipients were affected by the 1997 reform, although the impacts could vary widely. The Swedish social insurance authority estimated that this single policy change drove 70 000 couple-with-children households out of the housing allowance system in 1997 (RFV, 2003) .
The fact that only couple-with-children recipients were affected while single-parent recipients were virtually unaffected made the 1997 reform of the Swedish housing allowance system really resemble a quasiexperiment. Next, we explain our strategy of exploiting this quasi-experimental feature by the DD (difference-in-difference) estimator.
Empirical Methodology

Econometric Models
In empirical studies of event duration analysis, analysts usually do not model directly on the length of the event but on the conditional rate of ending this event, as all the information on the former can be deduced well from the latter. Meanwhile, the latter provides more fl exibility in analysing the impacts of timevarying determinants of event duration. In econometrics, the conditional probability of one event ending at a certain point in time is usually termed as a hazard
Formally, the hazard of recipient i at timeperiod t can be formulated as a function of both the duration-time variable and explanatory variables with the unknown parameter vector Θ λ λ ε
The covariate vector X it includes both timeconstant and time-varying observable explanatory variables, while time-invariant unobservable individual heterogeneity is summarised in the term ε i . To capture the relationship between current hazard and welfare history, the duration-time variable t enters the model directly. Following Meyer (1990) , we employ a piecewise-linear method to capture fl exibly the relationship between welfare history and current hazard
It is assumed here that a common baseline hazard between duration-time and conditional-exit hazard exists for all observations. The so-called proportional hazard specifi cation makes it easy to interpret the coeffi cients: any change of explanatory variables will multiply the hazard function by a scale factor and leave the shape of the baseline hazard unaffected. Meyer (1990) proved that the consistency of parameters is ensured with fl exible non-parametric estimation of the baseline hazard. The discrete-time hazard models can be applied either with logit models or with the complementary log-log model; the two models usually produce very similar estimates. The effect of unobservable heterogeneity in duration data (sometime termed frailty) is an important as well as intricate econometric issue. However, it has been shown that, with a fully fl exible specifi cation of the baseline hazard, the covariates parameters are little affected by the frailty specifi cation (Han and Hausman, 1990; Meyer, 1990) . In the empirical analysis, we experimented with all three frailty specifi cations.
Difference-in-difference Estimator
With the disincentives of the 1997 reform for couple-with-children recipients, described previously, we expected that housing allowances became less attractive to them after the reform and that the exit hazard of this group should be significantly higher after 1997. An easy way to capture the reform effect is the BA (before and after) estimator, which merely involves adding a dummy for the post-reform data. However, the BA estimator is likely to be contaminated by common trend effects that are simultaneously at work. Exploiting the quasi-experimental feature of the 1997 reform, we are able to construct a treatment group and a control group. Assuming that the reform did not distort the baseline hazard, the covariate-adjusted DD (difference-in-difference) estimator can be used to identify the reform impact in the following regression:
where, d97 is the dummy indicator of post-1997 spell observations and T is the dummy indicator of the treatment group observations. It is now clear that we can use the interaction term d97*T to identify the 'pure' effects of the 1997 reform on the treatment group after purifying the contaminations of trend effects that were common to both the treatment and control groups. Admittedly, here we ignore the possibility of the existence of trend effects that differed between the treatment and control groups. Unfortunately, the extent to which these effects will bias the DD estimation results is unknown.
When we use couple-with-children recipients as the treatment group and the singleparent recipients as the control group, we must allocate the observations based on their time-varying marital status during their entire welfare history.
6 However, one may naturally enquire as to whether the recipient's couple/single status is endogenous to his/ her exit hazard. Since the 1997 reform, the couple-with-children claimants have been treated discriminatorily. Thus, with the aims of maximising their total disposable incomes, some households may be induced to remain in, or adopt, single status rather than live with a partner. This paper carefully addresses this endogeneity issue.
Cautions on Measuring Interaction Effects
Essentially, the DD estimator is aimed at measuring how the changes over time to the outcomes-the exit hazards before and after the reform-differ between the treatment and control groups. If the differences between the two groups are signifi cant, we can infer that the changes to the hazards over time depend on whether the observation belongs to the treatment group; we will thus have evidence that the reform did infl uence the treatment group's exit hazards. In econometric terms, when the effect of changes in one independent variable on the outcome is dependent on the level or existence of another independent variable, this is an evidence of interaction effect. Yet, very importantly, one should be aware that in non-linear models the sign and statistical signifi cance of an interaction effect are unable to be inferred from the sign and statistical signifi cance of the interaction term.
Recently, Ai and Norton (2003) pointed out that econometric knowledge of the interaction effect in non-linear models is poorly understood by economic researchers. They reviewed 72 articles published in economics journals listed on JSTOR and found that none of these studies appropriately interpreted the coefficient of the interaction term in non-linear models. With knowledge of basic econometrics, we are informed that, in non-linear models, the marginal effect of a single variable is conditional on the value of the whole set of covariates and the size of its coeffi cient is not a valid measure of the marginal effect. However, without a shred of doubt, it is a common view that the sign of the coeffi cient of the interaction term is still valid for indicating the sign of the interaction effect in non-linear models. Nonetheless, as Ai and Norton (2003) have shown, for interaction effects measured in nonlinear models, even the sign and statistical signifi cance of the interaction term are an inappropriate source for inferences regarding the true interaction effect. Ai and Norton (2003) argued that, in non-linear models, looking only at the sign, statistical signifi cance and magnitude of the interaction term coeffi cient can be very misleading. First, in non-linear models, even when the estimated coeffi cient of the interaction term is assessed as zero or statistically insignifi cant by the standard of the commonly used t-test, the true interaction effect could be signifi cant for most observations. Secondly, the true interaction effect is conditional on the level of predicted outcome. The intuition behind this point is that, in non-linear models, the interaction effect is computed from the entire cross-derivatives of the covariates, thus its sign, signifi cance and magnitude should be dependent on the whole set of covariates as well. Therefore, in non-linear models, the interaction effect may have different values for different values of covariates and there is no simple summary of interaction effect. Only inspecting the distribution of the individual marginal interaction effect may be a useful source of inference from the model. Ai and Norton (2003) proposed a sound way to test and measure the interaction effects in non-linear binary response models. The STATA package inteff that performs this computation is described in Norton et al. (2004) . This paper follows their method of estimating and interpreting the interaction effects in hazard models.
Data and Empirical Hazards
Data and Sample Construction
The dataset was extracted from LINDA, the Swedish longitudinal individual database, which contains a 3 per cent annual representative sample of the Swedish population. LINDA is an extraordinarily rich dataset, providing longitudinal information on the individual and family characteristics of recipient households and allows our analyses to produce quite precise answers to the questions asked in this paper. The quality of information is reliably guaranteed as it is built upon taxpayer registration data. Our sample spans from 1991 to 2002 and is at the year level (see the Appendix). In this paper, we are concerned only with the family recipients of housing allowances (bostadstillägg till barnfamijer).
We set up the following observation selection criteria: they should not be disabled and not a full-time student; at the exit year, they should have at least one child and be not older than 65. Among the LINDA panel data for 1991-2002, we found 74 140 recipient observations that satisfied these criteria. Recipients who were on welfare in 1991 were tracked back to 1990 to identify their entry time. If spells were already on-going in 1990 or if the entry time was missing due to panel attrition, they were regarded as left-censored spells. For reasons mentioned previously, all left-censored spells were omitted from the sample. The number of remaining recipient observations was 57 601. The mean spell length of these recipient sample observations was 4.0 years and the standard variance was 2.7 years. We should point out that, if recipient observations were having multiple spells, only the longest spell was recorded. The share of multispell recipient observations is 16 per cent. If we had recorded the fi rst spell rather than the longest one, there would have been no major change in the fi ndings whatsoever.
Unfortunately, applying discrete-time frailty models is hideously computer-intensive and consumes enormous computation time. Limited by our computation resources, we could only use a 20 per cent random sample of the remaining recipient data in the empirical analysis. Nonetheless, as a check of robustness, we did run a logit model adjusted for clustering on the full sample and did not fi nd essential differences.
After these procedures, we constructed a sample database with 11 515 recipient observations from the 1991-2002 LINDA panel data. The sample consists of 2974 single-mother recipients, 2131 single-father recipients, and 5790 couple-with-children recipients (of which 2183 are husband-headed and 3597 wife-headed).
However, regarding the household head information, LINDA has a critical limitation. The 'household head' indicator in the couple households only indicates who is the older person within the household and is not related to who 'makes the decisions' . This is due to the institutional feature of the Swedish household registration system. One cannot say that husband-headed couple recipients are structurally different from wife-headed couple recipients with regard to spell duration. 7 However, we needed to ensure that we were truly comparing the behaviour responses of the household decision-makers.
We thus decided to use the husband-headed couple sample-that is, the husband-older couple recipient observations-to represent all couple recipient observations. For this reason, this paper focuses only on identifying reform effects on the male samples through the DD strategy. We have undertaken the DD estimation of female samples with the same model specifications as reported in this paper and found some subtle but not essential differences from the results of the male samples.
Empirical Hazards
Before conducting a formal analysis, let us fi rst get an intuitive impression of the general spell duration pattern across the samples. A good start is simply to use the Kaplan-Meier non-parametric empirical hazards.
8 Although the covariate effects are not decomposed here, this practice nonetheless gives a general intuitive sense of the duration dependence pattern and assists us in justifying the functional form of baseline hazard. It should provide preliminary evidence on the impacts of the 1997 reform. Figure 2 shows a comparison of empirical hazard functions among the three household types for the entire period. We fi nd that the duration dependence patterns are all nonmonotonic and fairly comparable across different household types. The irregular baseline hazard functions hint that no simple monotonic function can be used in specifying the duration dependence pattern. Figure 3 shows only the hazards for the post-1997 period for the three groups. It is apparent that all three groups experienced a sizeable jump in their empirical hazards subsequent to the 1997 reform, but the couple-with-children group clearly had the largest rise among the three groups. This is in line with the previous prediction that the 1997 reform had more impact on the couple-with-children recipients than on the others. Figures 2 and 3 also suggest that the post-1997 differentials in hazards could be absorbed vertically without changing the shape of baseline hazards.
Although informative, the observed patterns of aggregate empirical hazards are insufficient for guiding policy. Recipients entering in different years have different compositions of characteristics and are subject to different selection forces from varying contextual economic circumstances. To separate the influences of individual household characteristics, economic circumstances and duration dependence from the pure effect of reform, we must use the econometric models.
Estimation Results and Discussion
The main interest in this paper is to examine the impacts of the 1997 reduction in housing allowance benefi t generosity on the leaving speeds of couple-with-children recipients. However, before the primary topic is discussed, the estimated effects of individual household characteristics and the discovered patterns of duration dependence deserve some elaboration. Table 2 contains estimates from four logit discrete-time semi-parametric proportional hazard models with different covariate specifi cations. In our econometric practices, we have attempted estimations using both logit and complementary log-log models, but the two estimates were found to be very close so we have reported only logit model estimates while omitting complementary log-log estimates, in the interests of brevity.
Covariate Effects
In addressing the frailty issue, we experimented with both gamma frailty (in a complementary log-log model) and normal frailty (in a logit model) specifi cations, fi nding no substantial differences. Frailty terms appear signifi cant when covariate effects are not controlled. However, once the full set of covariates is included and especially when covariates are interacted with the group dummy, the frailty terms become negligible. In these econometric practices, we cannot state there are no risks of frailty misspecifi cations. However, since we estimate the baseline hazards non-parametrically for all models, the effect of frailty misspecifi cations on the coeffi cient estimates should be small.
The estimates of four different specifi cations of logit hazard models are reported in Table 2 . A fl exible step-wise baseline hazard is specifi ed for all the four models. Model 1 is estimated with two group dummies and one interaction term on the pooled samples (but none of the covariates is used). In Model 2, the full set of individual characteristics variables is added, but no regional controls are used. Model 3 adds local labour and housing market indicators. Model 4 contains the same set of covariates as in model 3, but model 3 restricts the single-parent and couple-withchildren observations to having the same covariate effects and duration dependence pattern, while model 4 allows the two groups to have different effects for each covariate, including the duration dependence pattern. Since the four models are nested hierarchically, we apply the LR (likelihood ratio) test to discern them. The LR test results show that model 4 clearly outperforms the others with respect to model fi tting.
9 Therefore, we hold to the interpretation of the model 4 results in the remainder of this paper. We found that, for both groups, no evidence of negative duration dependence was found and the exit hazards appear independent of spell length. Ethnicity, age, educational background, labour market status and local economic conditions all play important roles in determining the probability of leaving the housing allowance system. Hence, in the following section, we only discuss the estimates of the reform effect and exclude the issues of covariate effect and duration dependence.
Let us fi rst look at the estimated coeffi cient for the post-1997 dummy. The results from the four models reported in the fi rst row of Table 2 consistently suggest that all male recipients experienced a substantial rise in the exit hazards during the post-reform period. This is reasonably credited to the robust Swedish economy after 1997. However, when we turn to the main effect of being a couple, the results are not as clear-cut. When no individual Notes: * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. Individual household characteristics include: age interval dummies, education background dummies, unemployed dummy, employment industry sector dummies, social assistance recipient dummy and housing tenure indicator. They are measured at entry time.
characteristics are controlled for, it appears that couple-with-children recipients are less likely to exit than are single parent recipients. However, when individual characteristics and regional economic backgrounds are controlled, the differentials between the two groups become insignifi cant.
Reform Impact
Turning to the coeffi cient of the estimated interaction term, we fi nd that the estimates from the four models consistently report that its sign is positive and its statistical significance is high. Furthermore, the magnitude of this coeffi cient estimate decreases as more covariates are included and more complicated model specifi cations are used. Nonetheless, as was discussed earlier, the fi ndings thus far could be misleading if we use them to infer the reform effect. Table 3 reports the estimates using the method proposed in Ai and Norton (2003) to calculate marginal interaction effects in the setup of model 4, as it is believed to produce the most robust estimates. To understand intuitively the meaning of the interaction effects calculated in Table 3 , we plot two interaction effects in Figure 4 . One interaction effect is calculated conventionally and one is computed in accordance with Ai and Norton (2003) . 10 Both are plotted against the predicted hazards. In Figure 4 , it is plainly evident that the interaction effect is positive and substantial for overwhelming observations. It is also clear that the interaction effect is dependent on other covariates and is highest when the predicted hazard is around 0.6. The key idea advanced by Ai and Norton (2003) is that the statistical signifi cance of the interaction effect in non-linear models cannot be assessed from the value of the z-statistic of the interaction term reported in computer-produced regression output. Rather, it should be judged by the distribution of these z-statistics. As Table 3 shows, the narrow distribution of z-statistics suggests that the interaction effect is clearly signifi cant. Again, to assist understanding, in Figure 5 we plot the distribution of z-statistics of interaction effects against the predicted hazard. Each point in Figure 5 corresponds to an interaction-effect z-statistic estimated for each observation. The individual interaction effect is considered signifi cant if the z-statistic falls beyond the two bounds surrounding zerolevel line. From Figure 5 , it is clear that the interaction effect is highly signifi cant for most observations of the treatment group.
On average, the reform shifted up about 5.65 percentage point in the hazards of the couple-with-children recipients in the postreform period. To illuminate this more intuitively, we calculated the reform impact on a representative couple-with-children recipient. Due to the reform, this household experienced a rise of about 4.60 percentage points, or about 16.8 per cent, in the exit hazards.
11 This magnitude is undoubtedly sizeable and shows that the 1997 reform signifi cantly increased the leaving probabilities of couple-with-children recipients in the post-reform era.
Comparing DD Estimates with BA Estimates
We have previously pointed out the shortcomings of BA estimators. Nonetheless, despite these shortcomings, the BA estimate results do, however, provide a useful benchmark to assess the robustness of our DD estimate results. Since the BA estimator is contaminated with the unmeasured time-trend effects and we know that the Swedish aggregate economy performed better in the later 1990s than in the early 1990s, we expect the BA estimator to overestimate the effect of reform. We applied the BA estimators on recipients who were married at entry time. In Table 4 , we report the results of various BA estimators with different model setups and different controls of economic trends. The fi rst BA estimator is obtained in the setup of a complementary log-log model with gamma frailty. The remaining BA estimators are obtained when employing the random effect logit model. Both the fi rst and second BA estimators are controlled for economic-trend effects using county-level local unemployment rate variations together with county dummies. Compared with the second BA estimator, the third BA estimator is estimated without county dummies. The fourth BA estimator is again estimated with county dummies but we replace the local unemployment rate variations with national unemployment variations. Table 4 shows that, across different model specifi cations, the sign and statistical significance of the post-1997 dummy in the couple recipient group are consistent with those of the DD estimates reported in Table 2 . As expected, we found that all BA estimators produced much larger reform effects on couple-with-children recipients. Thus, this comparison not only supports the robustness of the DD fi ndings, but also shows the relative advantage of the DD strategy. Meanwhile, although not reported here, we found that the coeffi cients of the explanatory variables are not sensitive to model setup and different controls of economic trends, with respect to both direction and numerical value.
The Endogeneity Issue
A natural concern one may raise regarding our DD estimators is whether the single-couple status is endogenous in the models. With the reform, the chances of single/couple status and the exit decision being simultaneously determined by the recipients are high after 1997.
A simple option for testing the endogeneity issue of marital status is to use a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model by which the exit hazards and the probability of being married at entry time are estimated simultaneously. In this simultaneous equation system, we allow the unobserved determinants of both outcomes to be correlated and the possible simultaneity between the two outcomes is identified through the crossequation correlation coeffi cient. We estimate such a bivariate probit model for both the entire pool of male recipient observations and the male recipient spell observations Notes: * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. Individual household characteristics include: age interval dummies, education background dummies, unemployed dummy, industry sector dummies, social assistance recipient dummy and housing tenure indicator. They are measured at entry time.
only after 1997. In both samples, we found very small and very statistically insignifi cant cross-equation correlation coeffi cients. This shows that, at least for the male recipients, the simultaneity between the exit decision and the single/couple decision was rather weak. Another option for examining the endogenetiy of marital status is to apply the exogeneity test for the probit model proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986) . This test is a probit version of the Davidson-Mackinnon exogeneity test, which involves an auxiliary regression in which the suspected endogenous variable is expressed as a linear projection of instruments. We used marital status at the year prior to entry time as the instrument. The Smith-Blundell exogeneity test statistic we obtained for the entire pool of male observations is 0.792 and the Chi-squared (df = 1) p-value is 0.3733. For the male recipient spell observations, the Smith-Blundell exogeneity test statistic is 1.089 and the Chisquared (df = 1) p-value is 0.2967. Therefore, the exogeneity null between the recipient's marital status and his/her exit decision could not be rejected.
To save space, the estimation reports of this section are omitted in this paper, but available in Chen (2005) . Considering this evidence, we have reason to believe that the endogeneity of marital status should not be a serious concern in applying our DD estimator.
Conclusions
The past two decades have witnessed the growing importance of housing allowances in the housing policy of developed countries. Although the dynamics of housing allowance recipient spells have been the subject of attention in the housing literature in recent years (see Hungerford, 1996 , for the US case, Nordvik and Åhren, 2005 , for the Norway case, Ost, 2005, and Chen, 2006 , for the Sweden case), this fi eld still remains largely underdeveloped. This paper discussed the impact of the 1997 reform of Swedish housing allowance system on the leaving probabilities of recipients. It has reported that the 1997 reform, on average, moved up the exit hazards of couple-with-children recipients by about 17 per cent. This piece of evidence suggests that the 1997 reform has yielded a fairly clear result: the leaving speed of couple-withchildren recipients has increased greatly and substantial public expenditure on housing allowances has been saved. In this respect, the policy-maker's fi scal budget cutback aim with this reform has been a sort of success. Although our finding that recipients left faster when benefits droppped seems not excitingly surprising, 12 the work contained in this paper demonstrates how a robust empirical strategy can be designed to examine the sensitivity of recipient duration to changes in housing welfare, an issue that has been only discussed theoretically in earlier studies.
However, the overall assessments of the socioeconomic impacts of the 1997 reform are much more complicated. Housing allowances are not, and should never be treated as, just another income maintenance instrument. It has been well explained that one of the key reasons for maintaining a housing allowance system independent of the general social security system is its unique enablement function of supporting the poor in consuming housing at a socially desirable level (Åren, 2004; Stephen, 2005) . As a housing policy tool which increasingly replaces the roles of bricks-and-mortar subsidies and public housing construction programmes, the housing allowances system must maintain a good balance between effectively safeguarding the affordability of housing consumption for the poor and the desirability of not overburdening the public purse (Turner and Elsinga, 2005 
where, HA p is the applicable housing allowance, Y is the assessed income, and, Q is the income threshold. 5. In 1996, the bottom 10 per cent, median and top 10 per cent level of annual work income for a full-time Swedish employee were 157 700 SEK, 220 200 SEK and 357.5 SEK respectively (SCB, 2005). 6. We considered using single/couple status at entry time to allocate observations. However, for recipients who were on welfare earlier than 1997 and had changed their marital status before 1997, the reform impacts could not be identifi ed. 7. The LR test statistic of homogeneity between the two couple groups with respect to the distribution of spell duration is 3.58 and not signifi cant at 5 per cent. 8. The empirical hazard is the number of spells elapsed at the end of the spell interval divided by the pool of spells at risk at the beginning of that interval.
9. The LR test statistics of model 4 vs model 3 (df = 19) is 156.60 and the p-value <0.0001. 10. To understand why in Figure 4 there is not a single but four lines of interaction effect plotted when using the method of Ai & Norton (2003) , please note the X-axis is the predicted outcome, or the predicted probability that y = 1 in our case. Recall the defi nition of the interaction effect; the interaction effect of two variables X 1 and X 2 is the change in the outcome Y for a unit of change in both X 1 and X 2 . Figure 4 represents a Y-line with other covariates equal, but the value of (T, d97, T * d97) is different (see equation (4) in section 3). Each Y-line's value of (T, d97, T * d97) is one of the following: (1,1,1), (1,0,0), (0,1,0) and (0,0,0). 11. Here, a representative recipient is a native Swede with one child, aged below 25, education attainment less than middle school, employed in the public administration sector and residing in Stockholm county. The local housing market and labour market conditions are set at population-average levels. 12. For example, in 1995, the Swedish government reduced the replacement rate in unemployment insurance from 80 per cent to 75 per cent and the research by Carling et al. (2001) suggested that this benefi t cut caused an increase in the transition rate from unemployment to employment of roughly 10 per cent. 
